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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY 
ON HOW NOT TO REALIZE ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS,  AND A 
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE  
Dr. Ubong E. Effeh* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Observers of sub -Saharan Africa (SSA) 1 have no doubt become familiar with 
media images of one gruesome tragedy or another within the region – tragedies 
which, although essentially economic in nature, have traditionally been highlighted by 
human rights advocates in terms of its inability to realize the core rights proclaimed 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2: food, 
healthcare, housing and education.3 Africa thus continues to challenge the most 
seasoned of political economists, while reaffirming the prejudices of those who 
continue to believe in the “civilizing virtues” of colonialism. Theories upon theories 
have been propounded.  Countless “initiatives” have failed to make a difference. 
Africa has been turned into the most aid-dependent region in the world, while its 
people languish in misery. Put simply, the African status quo represents a depressing 
case study on how not to realize these basic human rights.  
¶2 This article aims to revisit some of the debates surrounding this very human 
(and wholly avoidable) tragedy. The idea is to offer an alternative insight into what 
might conceivably be the cause of so much human misery. More importantly, the 
                                                 
* Dr. Ubong E. Effeh has earned his L.L.B. (N. London), his L.L.M . (Essex) and his Ph.D. (Kent) and 
is currently a Lecturer in Law at the University of Sunderland, United Kingdom.  
1 Throughout the critique, the terms “sub-Saharan Africa” and “Africa” will be used interchangeably.  
Both refer only to the 47 countries that lie roughly south of the Sahara desert (including the Islands 
located in the nearby Atlantic and Indian oceans). These include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic), 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
2 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) UN Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The ICESCR recognizes a variety of rights which 
fall under the following broad headings: self-determination; gender equality; labour rights; social 
security; family rights; adequate living standards (including food, clothing and housing); healthcare; 
education; and cultural rights (including a right to benefit from scientific progress, and to the protection 
of aspects of one’s intellectual property). It is also necessary to note that although the primary focus of 
this article is on economic rights, this is in no sense an attempt to separate them from the better known 
category of civil and political rights as proclaimed under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res.2200A 
(XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Indeed, as will later 
become apparent, such a distinction is often impossible to maintain. 
3 These being the rights identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
body charged with monitoring the realization of the rights proclaimed under the ICESCR) as 
“minimum core obligations”.  See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 3 (Fifth Session,1990), UN Doc.E/1991/23, para.10.  
 
  
article will examine the possibility of using existing principles of international law 
(broadly defined) in a way that gives hope to a longsuffering people. In embarking on 
a critique of this kind, however, it is recognized that questions relating to economic 
development are best left to political economists. Nevertheless, it is also recognized 
that the nature of the problem demands some measure of interdisciplinarity, if only 
because this adds context to any legal analysis that will be offered. 
A. The Dangers of Generalization  
¶3 It is also necessary to acknowledge that the usual generalizations about the 
region can be quite misleading: Although homogenous in many respects, it is in fact 
an amalgamation of countries with varied characteristics. At two notable extremes are 
the examples of Mauritius and Botswana, which are not only fairly accountable 
democracies, but have combined economic growth with the progressive realization of 
their people’s basic economic, social and cultural rights; while others such as the 
bizarrely named “Democratic Republic” of Congo (which is neither democratic nor a 
republic), Zimbabwe and Somalia have, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist as 
viable States. At the same time, countries such as Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, and of 
late, Mozambique and Uganda, although not paragons of democracy, have either 
remained or have become relatively stable and are making efforts in the right 
direction. Still, even these categorizations do not sufficiently capture the sheer 
diversity of the region: Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, the Comoros, and 
Guinea Bissau have all managed to survive with relatively few natural resources, 
while Nigeria, Angola, and, of late, Chad and Equatorial Guinea have all been blessed 
with substantial quantities of oil, although, as will be shown in Part III, the citizens of 
most of these countries have become victims rather than beneficiaries of these 
resources. Even the physical geography of the region could justifiably be seen as an 
example of its diversity: From countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad 
which endure the harshness of the Sahara desert, to much of west and central Africa 
which broadly occupy the equatorial rainforest belt; from tiny island States such as 
Mauritius and the Seychelles, to much of southern Africa with its semi-arid savannah 
grasslands, Africa’s diversity has always been a surprise to the outsider, prompting 
one respected commentator to assert:  
[W]hen discussing the issue of human rights [on the continent as a 
whole], it is important to remember that the internal dynamics of 
individual countries are crucial to an understanding of the overall 
human rights context...The myriad social, religious, cultural, political 
and even idiosyncratic distinctions between the countries of the 
continent all need to be taken into account.  Thus, making broad 
prognostications and drawing sweeping conclusions for a continent as 
diverse and complex as Africa may be an exercise in futility. 4 
B. The Case for a Generalized Approach 
¶4 Although the validity of Oloka-Onyango’s assertion is beyond doubt, it is also 
the case that an outright rejection of this “generalized approach” is, more often than 
not, the first step in an attempt to deny the very existence of certain common features 
that have come to define much of the region. Many of its countries, for example, have 
either experienced fratricidal armed conflict of some kind in their post-colonial 
                                                 
4  J Oloka -Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary Africa: A New 
Dawn or Retreating Horizons?  6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. RE V. 39, 40-41 (2000).  
 
  
history, or are still enmeshed in one. Almost without exception, they have, at some 
stage, been ruled by obnoxious regimes of one description or another – from one-
party or military dictatorships, to what are, in essence, criminal gangs operating under 
the legitimacy of statehood – and in some cases, all of these combined. Except for 
very few exceptions, such as Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, no government 
within the region is willing or able to create the basic institutional and infrastructural 
capacity necessary for supporting any level of sustained economic activity, and by 
extension, the realization of basic economic, social and cultural rights (hereinafter 
economic rights). Indeed, even among the so-called “emerging democracies,” very 
few are truly representative or accountable to their citizens in the manner envisaged 
under various international human rights instruments.5 Nor should the widely 
acclaimed economic growth in countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda 
be taken out of context: Even if growth were a universally accepted yardstick for 
measuring human development,6 these would still have to be judged against the 
lowest possible base of past catastrophic conflicts in these countries, none of which, at 
any rate, has yet regained its modest pre-war prosperity. 7 Thus, provided the 
necessary caution is exercised, it is possible to adopt a generalized approach in a 
project of this kind. 
II. A SNAPSHOT OF THE STATUS QUO 
¶5 That sub-Saharan Africa has become synonymous with economic 
underdevelopment is perhaps too obvious to restate. What is often ignored is that as 
well as being a depressing economic state of affairs, this is also a very human tragedy 
– and one that appears destined to become much worse as time goes by. A snapshot of 
the nature of the tragedy is shockingly instructive: More than 300 million Africans – 
nearly half the region’s population – still live in extreme poverty. 8 The infant 
mortality rate stands at 91 per 1000 births, while the adult literacy rates for males and 
females are 30 percent and 47 percent respectively. 9 According to a recent 
collaborative report by the World Health Organization, the maternal mortality ratio in 
Africa stands at 830 per 1000,000, compared with Asia’s 330, with Latin America and 
the Caribbean at 190.10 As if these were not depressing enough, the HIV/AIDS 
                                                 
5 See generally  Art.21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, 
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GOAR, 183d plen. mtg., at 75, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] 
(stating that  “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections...”); Art. 25 of the ICCPR (broadly echoing the UDHR), 
supra note 2, at 179. 
6 For commentators on the broad political Left, the growth-based model is flawed because it does not 
take account of factors that  are not easily quantifiable in market terms.  See, e.g., Gerald Karl Helleiner, 
Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?, 10th Raul Prebisch 
Lecture, Address at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Palais des Nations, 
Geneva (Dec. 11, 2000). 
7 The respective growth rates for these countries being: Mozambique 12 percent; Rwanda 9.7; and 
Uganda 6.2. These, in any event, have been brought about by substantial aid flows of between 50 and  
70 percent of their annual budgets. See  Robert Guest, First Get the Basics Right, ECONOMIST , Jan. 15, 
2004, at 3. 
8 See AFRICA REGIONAL BRIEF 2002 (World Bank Group, 2002), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/africabrief.pdf. In discussing extreme poverty, it is important to note that 
“...Africa’s poor are the poorest of the poor.” See CAN AFRICA RECLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY? 4 (World 
Bank, 2000). 
9 See WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT (World Bank, 2004) 29, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2004/pdf/Volume_1.pdf. 
10  MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2000: ESTIMATES DEVELOPED BY WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA  2 (2004) 
available at  www.who.org. 
 
  
pandemic is destroying lives on the continent at an alarming rate. A recent United 
Nations report highlights the problems thus: 
Approximately 3.5 million new infections occurred in 2001, bringing 
to 28.5 million the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Fewer than 30 000 people were estimated to have 
been benefiting from antiretroviral drugs at the end of 2001. The 
estimated number of children orphaned by AIDS living in the region is 
11 million. Even if exceptionally effective prevention, treatment and 
care programmes take hold immediately, the scale of the crisis means 
that the human and socioeconomic toll will remain significant for 
many generations. 11 
¶6 Neither is the situation regarding nutrition any less disturbing. According to a 
joint UN mission to southern Africa in 2002, 12.8 million peop le were on the brink of 
starvation. 12 At the time, aid agencies were quick to blame the recurring spell of 
drought within the region. The on-going plague of locusts in the Sahel region may 
also not be man-made, and, like all natural disasters, almost certainly could not have 
been prevented. The disturbing fact, however, is that very few, if any, governments in 
SSA ever have in place even the most rudimentary arrangements for any such 
emergencies.13 For example, if nothing else, the provision of simple grain silos 
would save the ordinary African the indignity – not to mention the agony – of 
eternally relying on foreign aid when disasters strike. 
¶7 According to a collaborative study involving several UK government 
departments, as of 2000 over half of African countries were afflicted by war.14 In his 
report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General stated:  
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast 
majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 
countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for 
more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in 
more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. 15  
¶8 One year later, the Secretary-General also noted: “For many people in other 
parts of the world, the mention of Africa evokes images of civil unrest, war, poverty, 
disease, and mounting social problems. Unfortunately, these images are not just 
fiction...”16 With all of these factors at play – in some countries at the same time – it is 
little wonder that the life expectancy at birth in the region is only 47 years. 17 It also 
                                                 
11  REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS  EPIDEMIC 2002, U.N. GAOR Spec. Sess. on HIV/AIDS, 
UNAIDS/02.26E at 22-23.  See also  AFRICA REGIONAL BRIEF, supra  note 8, at 7. 
12 World Population Foundation, SOUTHERN AFRICA HUNGER REPORTS: 12.8 MILLION LIVES AT  RISK 
(June 7, 2002), available at http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/in_depth/Africa/sa_main_page020607.htm. 
13 As if to illustrate the point, a BBC report notes: “By responding quickly with pesticides, Arab 
countries managed to contain the damage. But in western Africa, where governments do not have the 
same resources to prevent the locusts from breeding, the situation is getting worse day by day.” Jannat 
Jalil, UN Appeal to Stop Locust ‘Plague’, BBC NEWS, Sept. 4, 2004, available  at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3628328.stm.   
14 DFID ET AL, THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT 5 
(2001). 
15 The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: 
Report of the Secretary-General , U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 10, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-
S/1998/318 (1998). 
16Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential, U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development, at i, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc.15 (1999). 
17  AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003 5 (World Bank, 2003). 
 
  
comes as no surprise that Africa has already become the only region in the world to 
miss the crucial economic benchmarks for meeting the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (which include the reduction of poverty by half by 2015);18 as 
well as being the only region to have become poorer within the past 25 years. 19  
III. POST-INDEPENDENCE  AFRICA: THE  BETRAYAL OF A  PEOPLE 
¶9 The crimes that were committed against the people of Africa during the period 
of colonization are of course a matter of record. From the systematic massacre and 
gratuitous mutilations of some 10-20 million Congolese people under Belgian King 
Leopold’s “rubber regime,”20 to the effective appropriation of the continent at the 
Berlin Conference; from the conscious desecration of traditional societal 
arrangements21 to the systematic process of economic underdevelopment,22 
colonialism constituted a deliberate dehumanization of a people in every imaginable 
respect. Moreover, it was a flagrant violation of the basic right to self-determination 
as proclaimed, at the time, under the UN Charter.23 Indeed, even without the untold 
suffering and countless deaths that defined the trans-Atlantic slave trade, 24 these 
crimes were in themselves sufficiently serious to warrant a struggle for independence 
and self-determination.  
¶10 Regrettably, however, independence for ordinary Africans has meant a life of 
even more flagrant human rights violations—in many instances by their supposed 
liberators. From the very beginning, the creation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in 1963 25 heralded the birth of an institution which was to become, whether by 
                                                 
18 See  United Kingdom Department for International Development, DEPARTMENTAL REPORT 2002: THE  
GOVERNMENT’S EXPENDITURE PLANS 2002/2003 TO 2003/2004 58 (April 2002). See also The role of 
theUnited Nations System in Supporting the Efforts of African Countries to Achieve Sustainable 
Development Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Economic and Social Council, ¶ 13, 41,U.N. Doc. 
E/2001/83 (June 12, 2001). 
19 See First Get the Basics Right, supra  note 7; see also AFRICA REGIONAL BRIEF, supra  note 8, which 
notes: “Africa is the only region in the world where the number of people living in extreme poverty has 
almost doubled, from 164 million in 1981 to 314 million today.” 
20 Although these crimes have never been formally documented, various sources have offered credible 
accounts of these atrocities. See, e.g., A. HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, 
TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 233 (1999) (10 million killed); Georges Nzonggola-ntalaja, 
The Congo From Leopold to Kabila 22 (2002) (approximately 20 million killed). 
21  For an excellent articulation of this see BASIL DAVIDSON, WEST AFRICA BEFORE THE COLONIAL 
ERA : A  HISTORY TO 1850 233-237 (1998). 
22 This took various forms. Examples include: the inheritance, by Guinea Bissau, of an old brewery 
which had been built to serve the Portuguese troops stationed there, 14 university graduates, and a 97 
percent illiteracy rate after three centuries of colonial rule,  DAVID LAMB, THE AFRICANS 5 (1983); five 
literate employees at the Mozambique education ministry overseen by a 23 year-old minister,  SUSAN 
GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT  86-87 (1994), at 86 and 87; while the Belgians left “a handful of 
university graduates” in the Congo,  AID AND REFORM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM TEN CASE STUDIES 
630 (Shantayanan Devarajan et al. eds., World Bank, 2001). 
23 U.N. Charter art.1, para 2. Even if it were to be conceded that much of Africa was still under 
colonization (and therefore not covered by this provision), the conduct of the colonialists would have 
been in breach of Art.73 of the Charter, under which UN Member States “accept[ed] as a sacred trust 
the obligation to promote to the utmost...the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories...” by 
ensuring, inter alia, “with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, 
economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against 
abuses...” 
24 See  ROUTES TO SLAVERY: DIRECTION, ETHNICITY AND MORTALITY IN THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE 
TRADE  (David Eltis and David Richardson eds., Frank Cass & Co, 1997). Ironically, desperate 
economic circumstances have reintroduced this odious trade to the Continent.  See TRAFFICKING IN 
HUMAN BEINGS, ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AFRICA (UNICEF/Innocenti Research Centre, 
2003). 
25 See  ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY CHARTER [hereinafter OAU Charter]. 
 
  
design or not, a legal framework for the perpetuation – and in many cases the 
aggravation – of the people’s misery. The principles of non-interference and fraternal 
solidarity became the overriding considerations in inter-African affairs. From a 
human rights perspective, this meant that even the abuses that characterised the 
immediate post- independence period received the approval of the organization, at 
least insofar as it actively discouraged any external inquiry. It follows that even the 
grisly violations that occurred under Idi Amin in Uganda, Marcias Nguema in 
Equatorial Guinea, and “Emperor” Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African 
Republic only managed to attract criticisms from very few Africa rulers, such as 
Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia. 26 Indeed, as a veteran of the United 
Nations human rights system, Philip Alston reveals that an attempt to include some of 
Amin’s excesses – e.g., the massacre of 75,000 of his fellow citizens within four years 
of coming to power – on the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights for 
consideration met with strong opposition from African delegates, supposedly because 
Amin was the chairman of the OAU.27 This resistance to scrutiny has continued to 
this date, the most recent being the disingenuous protection of Charles Taylor by the 
Obasanjo regime in Nigeria 28 from a UN-backed war crimes indictment for his role in 
the grisly violations that defined the Sierra Leonean civil war.29 
¶11 To be sure, the OAU Charter did make references to human rights concerns, 
including the principles of the UN Charter and of the UDHR, but only to the extent 
that they both “provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation 
among States”.30 There was also an allusion to “the welfare and well-being” of the 
people. 31 Nevertheless, it soon became clear that any reference to international human 
rights norms was simply a hollow proclamation. At any rate, events on the ground 
proved that the promotion of the “unity and solidarity of the African States” and the 
defence of “their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence”,32 however 
perversely interpreted, were to be the cornerstone of its Charter, as was the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of member States.33 
¶12 Oji Umozurike, who was later to become a Chairman of the African 
Commission on Human Rights, articulated the prevailing attitude within the OAU 
thus: “The OAU maintained an indifferent attitude to the suppression of human rights 
in a number of independent African states by unduly emphasising the principle of 
                                                 
26  U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights, 77 AM. J. INT’L  L. 902, 903 
(1983).  
27 See  THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 149 (Philip Alston ed., 
Clarendon Press, 1992).  
28 Disingenuous because although some observers might be tempted to commend Obasanjo for 
“averting a bloodbath,” two facts remain indisputable: First, the feared bloodbath had already been 
suffered by the Liberian people before the intervention of Nigerian troops. Secondly, given that Taylor 
had effectively become trapped in his “Executive Mansion,” an offer of asylum could serve only one 
purpose: saving a beleaguered tyrant from an imminent demise. 
29 For the text of Taylor’s indictment, see The Prosecutor Against Charles Ghankay Taylor (aka 
Charles Ghankay Macarthur Dakpana Taylor), Indictment, Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL 
-03-1 (Mar. 3, 2003) available at  http://www.sc-sl.org/taylorindictment.html. See also Press Release, 
Liberia: Nigeria's offer of "asylum" to President Taylor flouts international law, AI Index: AFR 
34/015/2003 (Public), News Service No: 162 (July 7, 2003), available at www.amnesty.org. 
30  OAU CHARTER, supra note 254, at para. 9. 
31 Id ., para.10. 
32 Id ., Art. II, para. 1(a) and (c). 
33 Id ., Art. III, para. 2. For an excellent critique of this topic, see J Oloka -Onyango, Beyond the 
Rhetoric:  Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa 26 CAL. W.INT ’L L. J. 
1, 42 (1995). 
 
  
noninterference...”34 Of particular interest is what amounted to a direc t admission by 
Sekou Toure of Guinea that the organization was not "a tribunal which could sit in 
judgment on any member state's internal affairs.”35 Moreover, the rights of individuals 
were usurped by “the State” in the name of “collective rights,” often in support of a 
perverse notion of “African values” or of Marxism – an ideology which had become 
fashionable at the time, but which very few of the region’s rulers seemed to 
understand. As one commentator noted: “Although claimed in the name of African 
ideals, collective rights serve state interests as well as the few who control state 
resources...[M]ost violations of human rights are often against those who speak out 
against the corrupt use of state resources.”36 Neither was economic development—
and by extension, the realization of economic rights—a priority. As noted by the late 
Claude Ake, “[t]he struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, 
including development, was marginalized.”37  
¶13 The indigent people of Africa have thus become caught in a tragic paradox: they 
were “liberated” from the yoke of colonial exploitation and all that went with it, only 
to become trapped in what have been decades of tyrannical misrule, systematic 
impoverishment, and merciless exploitation by their own rulers. It follows that the 
ideals of economic emancipation – the supposed inspiration behind the quest for 
independence – has become the subject of escapist antics, 38 grandiloquent rhetoric, 39 
and/or outright buffoonery. 40 Indeed, although political power no longer seems to 
induce the same degree of psychosis that appeared to be commonplace in the Banda 
and Amin days,41 countries such as Zimbabwe, Guinea Bissau and Equatorial Guinea 
have still not managed to escape the scourge of psychotic tyranny. It comes as no 
                                                 
34UMOZURIKE, supra  note 26, at 902. 
35 Id . at 902-903. 
36  Sakah S. Mahmud, The State and Human Rights in Africa in the 1990s: Perspectives and Prospects 
15  HUM. RTS. Q. 485 , 493 (1993). Indeed, it had been noted earlier that this was the case regardless of 
the State’s ideological inclination.  HARRY M. SCOBLE, Human Rights Non-Governmental 
Organizations in Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospects in the Wake of the Banjul Charter, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ronald I. Meltzer eds., State 
University of New York Press, 1984). 
37 See  C. Ake, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 7 (1996). 
38 The latest example of such antics being the so-called New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD), which is apparently a substitute for simple practical measures at the domestic level (e.g., the 
creation of basic State institutions and infrastructure) without which no sustainable economic activity 
can ever be possible (Relevant information available at  http://www.nepad.org/en.html). 
39 Indeed, according to one source, Mobutu and his ilk saw themselves as spokesmen for Africa’s 
economic emancipation. See W INSOME J. LESLIE, ZAIRE: CONTINUITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN AN 
OPPRESSIVE STATE 162-164  (1993). 
40 Amin’s ghoulish escapades aside, Mobutu is known to have changed his name from Joseph Desire 
Mobutu, to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Zabanga, which means “the earthy, the peppery, all-
powerful warrior who, by his endurance and will to win, goes from contest to contest leaving fire in his 
wake.” As if not to be outdone, Malawi’s “President-for-Life Ngwazi Dr H Kamuzu Banda” is reported 
to have decreed thus: “Only to Banda belongs the right to wear a three-piece suit, top hat, carry a fly-
whisk and ceremonial cane. Woe betide him that may exhibit the temerity to question or trample on 
this executive prerogative.” For both accounts, see GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY , AFRICA BETRAYED 105 
(1993). Further, Mobutu is reported to have once dismissed his political opponents as power-hungry 
opportunists, in spite of having wielded unfettered powers for well over three decades himself. See S. 
Kiley, Zaire: Apocalypse Now , TIMES (London), July 31, 1993, at M10.  He is also known to have once 
argued that “Zaire’s one-party state system is the most elaborate form of democracy.” See  AYITTEY , 
supra, at 210. 
41 According to one report, a clause in a car hire contract obliged the hirer, on seeing Banda’s 
motorcade, to drive off the road, switch off the engine, get out of the car, and stand to attention until 
the motorcade had passed. See  Theodore Dalrymple, Is There a Doctor-President in the House?: The 
Unhappy History of Physicians as National Leaders, NATIONAL REVIEW , March 8, 2004, at 28. 
 
  
surprise therefore, that twenty-nine of the thirty- four – over 85 percent – of the 
poorest countries in the world (in terms of human development) are from SSA.42  
A. The Scourge of Incessant Wars 
¶14 It was no less a person than the UN Secretary-General who asserted thus in 
1999: “For many people in other parts of the world, the mention of Africa evokes 
images of civil unrest, war, poverty, disease, and mounting social problems. 
Unfortunately, these images are not just fiction...”43 Post-independence Africa has 
therefore become synonymous with armed conflict. But this reputation has not come 
about as a matter of ill luck. To begin with, some of the region’s rulers became 
enmeshed in the Cold War game plan, apparently unable to appreciate that save for 
the odd evident bluff (suc h as the Cuban Missile Crisis), the main protagonists never 
seriously considered engaging each other in direct armed conflict. In the meantime, 
Africans became victims of supposed ideological wars in countries such as Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Angola.44 Indeed, in the case of Angola, its warring factions were 
not only unconcerned about the catastrophic impact of the conflict on their fellow 
citizens, but also became oblivious to the tragic irony that Russia had, by the 1990s, 
virtually become part of the G-7, and was in fact negotiating the terms of its 
association with the NATO alliance at the time. 45 In a television documentary 
highlighting the impact of the war on the Angolan people and expressing the hope that 
the death of the notorious warlord, Jonas Savimbi, would bring them peace, a visibly 
exasperated veteran ITN reporter, Michael Nicholson, was moved to remark: “...in 
Africa, things don’t quite happen the way they should.”46 Even where there had been 
no full-scale armed conflict, the impact of the Cold War was no less catastrophic; in 
Zaire, Mobutu’s role as a supposed bulwark against communism became a license to 
oppress, brutalize, and impoverish his people in a way that had very few parallels in 
other parts of the world.47 
¶15 Although the Cold War provided a convenient excuse for some of Africa’s 
wars, it was by no means the only one; African rulers do not seem to need any such 
excuse. Hence, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea have, until recently, been 
enmeshed in what has been widely described as one of the most senseless wars in 
history. 48 Indeed, Africa has even managed to create its own “world war” right in the 
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heart of the continent.49 In his report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-
General highlighted the scourge of conflict within the region:  
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast 
majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 
countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for 
more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in 
more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. 50  
¶16 By 2000, over half of African countries were affected by war, according to a 
paper published jointly by the UK’s Department for International Development, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence.51 Armed conflicts 
have become something that ordinary Africans must learn to live with.  
¶17 Even as the international community is being duped into believing that a 
supposed peace accord signed by the warring factions in the Congo would bring an 
end to the brutalization of the people of the region, 52 the Ivory Coast, long regarded as 
a beacon of hope for other African countries, has descended into bloody anarchy, due, 
in no small measure, to decades of tribal marginalization – a tried and tested means of 
exercising political power on the continent – and one which has been successfully 
exploited by the rebel factions in that country. 53 At the same time, Charles Taylor’s 
tyranny in Liberia would almost certainly have been replaced by the equally 
murderous rebel gangs that were poised to overrun the country’s capital, but for the 
intervention of foreign troops. 54 Nigeria, for the time being, appears to remain united 
only because its plundering ruling elite has a commo n interest in its vast oil reserves. 
Even here, stability cannot be taken for granted, with past rulers excluded from the 
plunder apparently determined to accentuate and exploit religious and tribal diversity 
to their own ends; 55 a situation which will almost certainly result in a repeat of an 
attempt, between the late 1960s and early 1970s, to exterminate the mainly Igbo tribe 
in the south east of the country – in retrospect, a precursor to what was to follow over 
two decades later in Rwanda. There is thus a clear pattern of leadership merely 
serving the narrow interests of Africa’s ruling elites, who, in the meantime, continue 
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to exhibit a contemptuous disregard for the basic needs and interests of ordinary 
Africans. 
B. The Plague of Kleptocratic Misrule  
¶18 Very few commentators would dispute the fact that Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire 
had become the very embodiment of “rule by theft” on the continent of Africa before 
his death. This, to be sure, is not without foundation: Mobutu not only emptied his 
country’s treasury into secret bank accounts abroad, but allowed this insidious ethos 
to permeate every level of government.56 But Mobutu was not alone; neither was his 
misrule particularly unique on the continent. As early as the immediate post-
independence years, Nigerian rulers had begun to set an example that was to become 
a living testament to mind-boggling profligacy, if not to supreme folly. This was 
highlighted in the English Court of Appeal case, Trendtex Trading Corporation v 
Central Bank of Nigeria.57 Although its legal significance is not of relevance to this 
article,58 the facts remain a source of great embarrassment to many African students 
of commercial law (and indeed, of international law): Defence ministry officials had 
ordered 20 million tons of cement from some 80 different suppliers, at a cost of over 
US$8 billion (in 1975 prices). Unsurprisingly, over 400 ships converged on Lagos, 
with more arriving daily, completely paralysing a port that was, in any event, 
inadequate for such shipments. As explained by Lord Denning MR: 
All the berths were occupied. There were 300 to 400 ships outside 
waiting. More ships were arriving daily...All of those waiting were on 
demurrage. It was because the government departments had ordered far 
too much. No doubt Nigeria needed cement. It was a country which 
was developing fast. They were building houses, factories, barracks, 
and so forth. All of the work required cement. Previously the average 
rate of import through all ports had been two million tons of cement a 
year. Yet early in 1975 the government departments then in 
charge...had ordered 10 times that quantity...to be delivered over the 
next 12 months...Even for all commodities together, the discharging 
capacity at Lagos...did not amount to two million tons a year. Yet here 
was 10 times that amount arriving - of cement alone - leaving nothing 
for other vital imports of food and materials.59 
¶19 To be sure, no evidence of corruption was adduced in Trendtex; but neither 
would that have been necessary in light of the nature of the main question put before 
the Court of Appeal. In any event, given that an incoming military regime found it 
necessary to describe the various transactions as "unorthodox, imprudent or 
inequitable,"60 this cannot be ruled out either. Whatever the case, the Trendtex  episode 
was to become a mere prelude to how the country was to be misgoverned, with the 
Abacha regime taking “Mobutuism” to a different depth, adeptly combining Mobutu’s 
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plundering disposition with a degree of viciousness unparalleled in Nigeria’s 
history. 61  
¶20 Neither are these the only examples of corrupt misrule on the continent. 
According to a recent report by Human Rights Watch, between 1997 and 2002, the 
Angolan government had been unable to account for funds totalling about US$4.22 
billion. The report adds:  
In those same years, total social spending in the country – 
including...government spending as well as public and private 
initiatives funded through the United Nations’ Consolidated Inter-
Agency Appeal – came to $4.27 billion. In effect, the Angolan 
government has not accounted for an amount roughly equal to the total 
amount spent on the humanitarian, social, health, and education needs 
of a population in severe distress.62 
¶21 Indeed, another report by The Economist reveals that up to 20 Angolans are 
worth $100m or more. Six of the seven richest of these are government officials; the 
remaining one only recently retired.63  
¶22 And, just when these were becoming perhaps the most glaring examples of 
kleptocratic misrule on the continent, Teodoro Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea treated 
viewers of a recent Channel 4 television news programme to an astonishing insight 
into his approach to governance: It was indeed the case, he admitted, that his 
country’s new found wealth from oil, a “state secret,” was kept in his personal bank 
account in Washington. This, in his words, was because: “I am the one who arranges 
things in this country because in Africa there are a lot of problems of corruption, the 
diversion of money. If there is corruption, diversion of funds, then I'm responsible. 
That's why I'm a hundred per cent sure of all the oil revenue because the one who 
signs is me.”64 As it happened, the only beneficiaries of this mindless plunder were 
shown to be his immediate family, with his son shamelessly exhibiting a collection of 
expensive cars, sampling fine wines and exquisite watches in Paris. In the meantime, 
the only hospital in the capital – built by Spain during the colonial days – was 
overwhelmed with victims of malnutrition, as well as patients suffering from ma laria 
and other diseases.  Indeed, as if to illustrate the fact that the level of psychosis that 
defined the Banda and Bokassa years has not diminished on the continent, the 
country’s State-owned radio is reported to have declared that Mr Mbasogo “can 
decide to kill without anyone calling him to account and without going to hell because 
it is God himself, with whom he is in permanent contact, and who gives him this 
strength. ”65 In virtually every part of the continent, its people have become helpless 
victims of rulers who have become insensitive to their suffering, and contemptuous of 
their basic needs. 
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C. The Charade of “Democratic” Governance 
¶23 An impoverished Nigerian tailor, Muhammad Umaru, reportedly said: “When 
we were in the military regime, we didn’t get anything from the government, but we 
had peace. Now we are in a democracy, we don’t get anything from the government, 
and we don’t have peace.”66 Regrettably, such views are often ignored in academic 
literature on Africa. Instead, there appears to be a deter mination to highlight a 
supposed new dawn of democracy in the region. A collaborative paper published by 
the World Bank puts it thus: “Most...African governments conceded the principle of 
democracy in the first half of the 1990s. By 1999 nearly all countries had held 
multiparty elections...”67 An IMF paper also highlights how supposed political 
liberalization and participatory democracy are complementing economic reforms in 
the region. 68  
¶24 The reality, however, is that the so-called new breed of leaders are in no way 
different from their immediate post- independence contemporaries, and are in many 
ways worse. Indeed, the apparent manifestation of democratic governance has so far 
proved to be a cynical façade – a smokescreen for the preservation of the past. Even 
Thabo Mbeki’s much-vaunted quest for an “African renaissance,” for example, 
appears to be rooted in sheer escapism and astonishing obtuseness: a feckless attempt 
to challenge the universally accepted scientific fact – that AIDS is caused by the HIV 
virus – rather than in taking steps to reverse the pandemic itself.69  
¶25 In Nigeria, this supposed new democratic, post-Abacha era began with 
legislators awarding themselves up to 3.5 million naira in furniture allowances (about 
$35,500, in a country where the average monthly civil service salary is only about 
$200), rather than taking steps to alleviate the suffering of ordinary Nigerians.70 The 
same country’s supposedly democratically elected leader, Obasanjo, has not only 
proved himself a consummate human rights violator, but has in fact sought to justify 
the massacre of unarmed civilians by his military forces.71 Another, report highlights 
systematic and widespread violations of civil and political rights, particularly freedom 
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of expression, by the country’s security agencies acting with absolute impunity. 72 In a 
decision remarkably reminiscent of Felix Houphet Boigny’s squandering of his 
nation’s resources on a multi-million dollar basilica when the personal incomes of 
ordinary Ivorians were deteriorating by as much as 50 percent, 73 Obasanjo evidently 
regards the installation of a satellite system in space to be a more urgent governmental 
function than improving the healthcare and  educational needs of his fellow citizens.74  
The same ruler, for good measure, is currently negotiating the purchase of missile and 
other defence technologies from North Korea.75 On his part, Paul Biya of Cameroon, 
in 1999, had a personal airport built near his presidential retreat of Mvomeka. 76 As if 
not to be outdone, the King of Swaziland has elected to squander the equivalent of his 
country’s entire health budget of $45 million on the purchase of a private jet, at a time 
when his people are either dying of starvation, or of HIV/AIDS, if not both. 77  
¶26 The above are by no means the exception. In 1985, Mengistu and his obnoxious 
Dergue regime in Ethiopia treated the world to what was most probably the worst 
post-Biblical famine it had ever witnessed – a tragedy which prompted the Live Aid 
campaign. Roughly two decades afterwards, the people of Ethiopia, this time under a 
supposed democratic dispensation, experienced a repeat of this tragedy, due in no 
small measure to a senseless war with neighbouring Eritrea. 78 Indeed, the UN 
Secretary-General was so infuriated by the conduct of both nations that he cast his 
diplomatic discretion aside during a newspaper interview and lamented:  
The quality of the leaders, the misery they have brought to their people 
and my inability to work with them to turn the situation around are 
very depressing...In many countries the wrong kind have made it to 
leadership. They seek power for the sake of power and for their own 
aggrandisement rather than having a real understanding of the need to 
use power to improve their countries. 79 
¶27  In Liberia, a supposed democratic mandate given to Charles Taylor after his 
brutal war which led to the ousting and the eventual murder of his equally vicious 
predecessor, Master Sergeant “General” “Doctor” Samuel Doe, became a licence to 
subject his people to further misery, as he set about plundering his country’s 
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irreplaceable rainforest for personal gains. 80 Even Nyerere’s successors in Tanzania, 
not long ago, elected to waste the country’s meagre resources on the purchase of a 
sophisticated military air defence system, even though fees have been introduced in 
schools.81  
¶28 It is therefore understandable that a recent Human Rights Watch report devoted 
a section entitled: “Elections, But Not Necessarily Democracy” to highlighting 
various human rights violations on the continent, including rigged elections, the 
suppression of press freedom, and torture and political killings.82 The hollowness of 
political reforms in Africa has also been illustrated by the newsmagazine The 
Economist, which declared: “A new sort of African leader is trying to break the 
addiction to foreign aid, and to the idea that Africa's woes can be blamed forever on 
the legacy of colonialism…Little noticed by the rest of the world, much of sub -
Saharan Africa is in the midst of an upturn.”83 Three years later, the same publication 
highlighted the reality of African leadership in a cover story titled “Hopeless 
Africa.”84 One keen observer of the region, commenting on freedom of expression, 
asserted:  
The veneer of democratization that accompanied the achievement of 
self-government was rapidly stripped away by leaders anxious to 
preserve their version of national unity, and/or by military elites who 
shot their way into power. Multi-party systems were consolidated into 
single -party systems, then into one-man systems. With the ‘second 
independence’ of the 1990s, in which open political competition 
returned to many countries, freedom of expression seemed to obtain a 
new lease on life. In my judgment, however, the overall climate 
remains inhospitable.85  
¶29 For ordinary Africans therefore, a supposed ne w era of democracy on the 
continent has simply been a repeat of the transition from colonial subjugation to one 
of economic misery and tyranny; the very notion of democracy itself yet another 
instrument in the arsenals of the region’s merciless despots.  
IV. A PROFUSION OF SPECIOUS THEORIES  
¶30 One of the most tragic realities of post-colonial leadership in much of Africa is 
that the chaos it has created easily lends itself to all manner of theories.  One measure 
of this disorder is that almost every one of these theories seems to carry a certain 
degree of validity – except when subjected to even the most cursory examination.  
                                                 
80 See The Pariah President: How a Tyrant’s ‘Logs of War’ Bring Terror to West Africa, OBSERVER, 
May 27, 2001. See also Timber ‘Fuels Liberia’s War Machine’, BBC NEWS, Aug. 9, 2001, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1480000/1480516.stm. 
81 See  David Hencke and Larry Elliott, Just What They Need – a £28M Air Defence System , GUARDIAN , 
Dec. 18, 2001.  Even the World Bank has been sufficiently concerned to seek the opinion of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization regarding the necessity of such a sophisticated system. 
According to the World Bank, the ICAO has in turn raised concerns about the system. See World 
Bank's Statement on Tanzania's Air Traffic Control (ATC), News Release No: 2002/354/AFR, June 13, 
2002 available at  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/. 
82 See World Report 2002, supra  note 69. 
83 Emerging Africa, ECONOMIST , June 14, 1997, at 13. 
84 See  Hopeless Africa, ECONOMIST , May 13, 2000, at 17. Although the report was primarily about the 
civil conflict in Sierra Leone, it also highlighted the grim political and economic realities on the 
continent. 
85 C. E. Welch Jr., The African Charter and Freedom of Expression in Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 103, 105 (1998). 
 
  
A. Africa: A Victim of History and Culture 
¶31 One common theory is that Africa’s inability to develop is a function of its 
history and culture. This position has been most forcefully articulated by The 
Economist: “[M]ost of the continent’s shortcomings owe less to acts of God than to 
acts of man...brutality, despotism and corruption exist everywhere – but African 
societies, for reasons buried in their culture, seem especially susceptible to them” 
[emphasis added].86 And it concluded: “Africa’s biggest problems…were created by 
African society and history.”87 A major World Bank study, while acknowledging that 
the “roots of state failure” in the region are “many and complex,” nevertheless 
concludes: “Chief among them has been a continuing struggle between traditional 
forms of governance and social organization (often based on tribes, lineages, and 
language and kinship groups) and modern forms of government.”88 
¶32 Yet proponents of this theory have failed to identify this supposedly 
homogenous cultural pattern amongst the people of the region, which is inherently 
inimical to the realization of human rights. Indeed, although there is a definite, 
discernible “culture” of misrule at the level of leadership, Africa is an amalgamation 
of various “cultures” – a fact acknowledged thus by another human rights advocate 
from the region: “... [T]he diversity of African peoples and their societies defy easy 
categorization or generalization.”89 In any event, there are numerous historical 
accounts of practices in pre-colonial Africa that are in consonance with established 
human rights norms. For example, according to another African commentator, the 
virtues of participatory democracy and freedom of expression were well entrenched in 
the African social order before the arrival of the Europeans; these being particularly 
evident at village meetings where views were freely expressed and ideas exchanged, 
in societies where the concepts of justice, order, and fairness were well developed.90  
Indeed, although the practice of slavery is hardly reconcilable with universally human 
rights norms, a renowned African historian reveals that even those regarded as slaves 
could own property, elect and send representatives to the King’s court, and request an 
audience with him – hence, a certain Jubo Jubogha (renamed Jaja by the Europeans), 
who was born in 1821 and sold as a slave to a Bonny trader in 1833 in the Niger delta 
area of present-day Nigeria, was later elected head of the Anna Pepple House, and 
succeeded the King in 1863.91  
¶33 Another African commentator, Kofi Busia, describes a system of checks and 
balances – an indispensable element to modern democratic governance, and thus, to 
the realizatio n of human rights – in his native, pre-colonial Ghanaian society: 
Although the Akan chief is renowned for wielding enormous powers, this is only 
theoretical; the chief rarely makes policy. In the wider traditional setting, the chiefs 
are never above the customary norms and taboos that govern everyone else. To check 
their power, they are surrounded by various bodies and institutions. Before taking 
office, the chief is often required to take an oath. In the case of the Krontihene of the 
Ashanti, part of the formal admonition is: “When we give you advice, listen to it. We 
do not want you to abuse us; we do not want you to regard us as fools; we do not want 
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autocratic ways; we do not want bullying; we do not like beating...take the stool.”92 
Further examples have  been proffered, such as the existence of freedom of movement 
and of association. 93 The right to education, it is explained, was a collective 
responsibility, although the primary emphasis was on the virtues of good 
citizenship.94  
¶34 Whether these practices are reflective of the general state of affairs in pre-
colonial Africa is of course a matter of conjecture, not least because much of Africa’s 
history is rooted in the oral tradition, with its inherent methodological problem of 
unreliability. Indeed, for every such example of adherence to human rights, it is 
possible to cite others that point to the contrary: The traditional practices of female 
genital mutilation95 and wife-beating96 are hardly compatible with universally agreed 
human rights standards. Neither is the usual emphasis on collectivism (at the expense 
of individualism) 97 unproblematic when set against the language of the UDHR.98 
Nevertheless, to suggest that certain traditional practices are responsible for Africa’s 
economic backwardness represents a misleading and dangerous extrapolation – and 
one that has assisted in no small measure in diverting critical attention from the real 
cause of the region’s dismal economic situation. 
¶35 To be sure, many African rulers themselves have often sought to justify their 
human rights violations by appealing to a perverse notion of what human rights 
advocates often describe as “cultural relativism” – a theory which holds that because 
societies are products of their peculiar historical and cultural development, their 
conceptions of human rights must necessarily be allowed to reflect such experiences.  
In effect, this theory rejects the universality of human rights,99 by invoking certain 
alluring (if ill-defined) notions such as “African culture,” “African values,” or 
“African civilization.” A good example of this tendency is evident in the continent’s 
human rights instrument, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights – itself 
an absurdity in human rights terms, given the peculiar circumstances of its adoption100  
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– the preamble of which affirms “the virtues...and the values of African 
civilization.”101  This, it is safe to assume, reflected a speech by the then Senegalese 
leader Leopold Senghor, in which he urged the Charter’s drafters to “keep constantly 
in mind our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa.”102 Indeed, if the 
African Charter represents the legal blueprint of this mindset, the earlier cited 
Channel 4 television news report on Equatorial Guinea highlights its real- life 
manifestation: In spite of being the world’s fastest growing economy due to its new-
found oil wealth, its people continue to languish in economic misery.103 Challenged 
by the intrepid Lindsey Hilsum about this, its ruler retorted: "I can assure you that 
there's no poverty in Guinea...[t]here's no deprivation either...You have to understand 
the level we're at in Guinea. The first problem is the people's cultural level. The 
people are used to living in a very different way, which you people think is poverty. 
In Guinea what we have are shortages." 104  An equally absurd explanation was 
proffered in response to a question on the lack of democratic accountability: “I think 
Equatorial Guinea's democracy is the most open, the most transparent. We are 
following a kind of democracy which fits the style and customs of Equatorial 
Guinea.”105  
¶36 Mr Mbasogo, to be sure, is not a trailblazer amongst his peers. As noted by Jack 
Donnelly, his predecessor and uncle, widely acknowledged as one of Africa’s most 
vicious tyrants – and who was murdered by Mbasogo in a co up that brought him to 
power –  called himself “Grand Master of Popular Education, Science, and Traditional 
Culture.”106 Indeed, as Donnelly points out, similar arguments have been proffered by 
other African despots. For example, Hastings Banda of Malawi successfully stifled 
opposition to his rule by subjecting his victims to a very un-African judicial process 
called “traditional courts,” in which the accused had no right to legal representation, 
and from which they could appeal only to him in person.107  Mobutu, for his part, 
revived the practice of Salongo – a kind corvee labour inherited from his country’s 
colonial past.108 Indeed, it is safe to assert that the usual mantra, “African solutions to 
African problems,” is an offshoot of this perverse mindset. From the vociferous 
defence of Mugabe’s conduct by his fellow rulers in spite of the misery he has 
inflicted upon the Zimbabwean people,109 to the shielding of Charles Taylor from 
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international justice by Nigeria’s Obasanjo, this appeal to cultural relativism has 
exposed ordinary Africans to a life of unparalleled misery. Little wonder, therefore, 
that as will be illustrated in Part V, responses by the international community to the 
continent’s tragedies are often based on undisguised cynicism: Africa, it appears, does 
not deserve the basic rights which the rest of the world is beginning to take for 
granted because its values and expectations are peculiarly different. 
B. Post-Colonial Africa: A Victim of Berlin  
¶37 Another thesis attributes Africa’s wars and economic problems to the outcome 
of the Congress of Berlin and the consequent partitioning of the continent in 1885 
along what is widely believed to be arbitrary boundaries. The resultant dislocation of 
traditional arrangements, it is argued, has been a source of conflict in much of the 
continent. 110  Even the usually persuasive Basil Davidson has become one of the main 
proponents of this viewpoint: 
[I]n 1885, half a dozen powerful European nations...decided to share 
out Africa...but not, of course, without going to war against 
Africans...Africa was being divided up into many ‘colonies’...ruled 
directly and dictatorially by European governments, along frontiers 
fixed between the European powers...A great and deep disaster for the 
peoples of Africa, the colonial period deprived them not only of their 
political freedom and the right to think for themselves, thus bringing to 
a stop the onward flow of Africa’s own history, but also, in large 
measure, undermining their sense of confidence and self-respect. 111  
¶38 Yet, it was Nelson Mandela who once asserted: “Africa is beyond bemoaning 
the past for its problems. The task of undoing that past is ours...we must take 
responsibility for our own destiny, that we will uplift ourselves only by our own 
efforts in partnership with those who wish us well.”112  
¶39 It is also hard to ignore the fact that, as pointed out by the former Africa 
specialist of The Economist  Richard Dowden, none of the factions in the region’s 
wars is calling for changes to boundaries drawn by the colonial powers; in fact, many, 
if not all, of the wars have been instigated by individuals seeking access to the 
trappings of power at the centre. 113  In any event, it is the case that colonialism did also 
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forge what might be described as an artificial union between the native Malays, the 
Chinese, and the Indians in Malaysia, a country comparable in many respects with 
Ghana, but which has managed to outperform the entire region of SSA (including 
South Africa) economically.114 Indeed, it is ironic that the most heterogeneous 
country in SSA itself (namely Mauritius), with its medley of racial and religious 
groups – including Hindus, Muslims, Creoles, native Africans, and Europeans – has 
achieved a level of development that has eluded even the most homogenous countries 
in the region. 115 Moreover, even if the redrawing of boundaries were the solution to 
Africa’s problems, its proponents might wish to explain why it was unable to prevent 
what was, even by Africa’s standards, a most senseless war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea soon after the latter’s secession following a 1993 referendum supported by 
both sides. The inescapable fact is that a tragic – though by no means unique116 – 
event in the continent’s history has become yet another excuse for commentators who 
are unwilling to accept that African rulers owe certain basic responsibilities to their 
long-suffering people. 
C. The Economic Dependency Thesis 
¶40 The dependency thesis, widely attributed to the late Stephen Hymer, posits that 
international economic relations are premised on an inherent power imbalance 
between rich and poor countries, mediated by the modern transnational corporation 
(TNC), whose organizational structures – e.g., the global distribution of its decision-
making centres – and policies inexorably result in “specialization by nationality.”117 
Poor countries, it is argued, thus find themselves in a position of “structural 
subordination” vis-à-vis the industrialized ones. 118  Indeed, much of this thesis is 
evident in the writings of political leaders such as the late Nyerere of Tanzania, who 
mused: “First, where in our lands are those citizens who have sufficient capital to 
establish modern industries; and second, how would our infant industries fight other 
capitalist enterprises?”119  Of late, this argument has been revived by no less than 
Fantu Cheru, who, while acknowledging the impact of wrong policy choices by SSA 
governments, is equally scathing about what he sees as the rules established by 
Western European powers, by which the region would participate in the global 
economy. Put simply, Africa was to produce raw materials and agricultural goods for 
Western industries and consumers: coffee and tropical fruits by Kenya, cotton by 
Sudan, bananas and pineapple by the Ivory Coast, cocoa by Ghana, and groundnut by 
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Senegal.120 The implication, of course, is that Africa remains a casualty of these 
“rules.” 
¶41 There is little doubt that this theory had some validity in the immediate post-
independence years, not least because colonial ties were still strong at the time, with 
many developing countries retaining their roles as sources of raw materials for 
finished products in Western markets. With the passage of time, however, the theory 
seems increasingly at odds with the facts. For example, its proponents would have 
much difficulty in explaining why it is that Ethiopia and Liberia, which have never 
been colonized in the sense described in Part III – and therefore presumably have 
never been subject to such “rules” – have become two of the poorest and most chaotic 
countries in the region. Moreover, it remains unclear why such “rules” should apply 
more rigidly to Africa than to any other region of the world. Indeed, even if it were 
the case that certain unknown factors or forces have conspired to keep Africa in such 
a disadvantageous position, the emergence of countries in “developing Asia” from 
such apparent colonial designs – not to mention Mauritius, itself a SSA country – 
makes it possible to argue that such “rules” can in fact be “broken” with imaginative 
leadership.  
D. Africa: A Casualty of the Global Economic Regime 
¶42 Of all the theories offered to explain Africa’s inability to develop, this one 
seems the most persuasive. A variant of the dependency thesis, and an article of faith 
amongst commentators on the broad political left, it holds that Africa is a casualty of 
an unfair, ideologically-driven global economic order whose interests are inherently 
detrimental to those of poor countries generally. 121 Indeed, it has become the fuel that 
propels the engines of the anti- globalization movement, and is often articulated in the 
contexts of the region’s crippling debt burden and its inability to trade.122  
¶43 To be sure, the perils of globalization have been acknowledged by even its most 
ardent proponents.123 Indeed, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC), 
if nothing else, represents an implicit admission of the inappropriateness of the 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund on the region following the debt crisis.124 Yet, as 
Frances Stewart points out, these po licies did not simply emerge from the blue, to be 
imposed on economies that were otherwise healthy.125 Flawed though they were, 
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SAPs were an attempt to rescue the region from a leadership unwilling to see beyond 
its own selfish interests. It is, after all, the case that to this date, no commentator can 
point to any single poverty-alleviating project in the region that is attributable to the 
loans that resulted in the debt crisis, although at least some of the proceeds have 
almost certainly financed the most egregious human rights violations by some 
governments, such as Mengistu’s in Ethiopia and Mobutu’s in Zaire – not to mention 
the apartheid regime in South Africa. Nor can one ignore the fact that the most 
vociferous advocates of trade liberalization preside over the most protectionist 
economies, particularly in the areas in which Africa might be said to have what 
classical economists call comparative advantage, namely primary produce. 126   
¶44 Yet too much is often read into this state of affairs, at least insofar as 
commentators often ignore the fact that the United States and the European Union 
(amongst the most powerful trading countries) have put in place preferential regimes 
aimed almost exclusively at SSA. 127 These regimes, to be sure, are not beyond valid 
criticism. Eligibility for the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act 
scheme is based, inter alia, on its beneficiaries’ willingness to adopt wide-ranging 
neo-liberal reforms that are not dissimilar to the much-discredited SAPs; 128  while the 
EU’s Everything But Arms initiative currently excludes certain “sensitive” products, 
namely, rice, sugar and fresh bananas.129 But then, to expect a purely altruistic trading 
regime, or indeed, the morally impeccable practice of “fair trade,” would amount to a 
dangerous misunderstanding of the very essence of international economic relations: 
the preservation of national self- interest, however defined. In any event, it is also 
important to note that from all indications, even these relatively preferential regimes 
have not been utilized to any significant degree130  – an unsurprising state of affairs 
given Africa’s notorious, near-total lack of institutional and infrastructural capacity,131  
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without which no meaningful or sustainable economic activity is possible. Moreover, 
the very fact that much of “developing Asia,” once in the same state of colonialism 
and underdevelopment as Africa, is emerging as an economic powerhouse in its own 
right, globalization notwithstanding,132 illustrates the simple fact that Africa must not 
wait until self-interest is completely eliminated from international economic relations 
before its rulers begin to adopt the very elementary measures necessary for the 
emancipation of their people from economic misery.  133 
E. Perspectives From African Rulers 
¶45 Unsurprisingly, African rulers have accepted no responsibility whatsoever for 
the continent’s depressing state. For example, the so-called Lagos Plan of Action – 
itself a 1980s version of the much-heralded NEPAD134  – blamed Africa’s economic 
woes on “[t]he effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies...”135 It 
adds, “...despite all efforts made by its leaders, [Africa] remains the least developed 
continent...exploitation has been carried out through neo-colonial external forces...”136 
This view was later echoed by Nigeria’s ambassador to Washington, who reportedly 
stated: “Certainly, Nigeria is not free from worldwide economic and social malaise, 
largely caused by external factors, like unfavourable trade terms and fluctuating 
commodity prices.”137  And this, in spite of the fact that economic mismanagement 
and endemic corruption has meant the conscious neglect of the country’s agricultural 
sector by each of its post-independence regimes in favour of oil, which, as of 2002, 
accounted for over 95 percent of the country’s export receipts. 138  This escapist 
mindset has become the basis for Africa’s interaction with the rest of the world, as 
evidenced during the recent collapse of world trade talks in Mexico, where its 
delegates were among the most vociferous in blaming protectionism for their 
countries’ inability to trade, 139  even though as already noted, very few of the region’s 
countries are in a position to utilize the current preferential regimes, particularly those 
offered by the EU and the United States. 
V. AFRICA’S  MISERY: SOME  DISTURBING INSIGHTS   
¶46 Of all the explanations often proffered for Africa’s state of chronic 
underdevelopment, some of the most insightful and persuasive are those offered 
(separately) by George Ayittey140 and Nicolas van de Walle.141 For Ayittey, the 
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people of the continent have been betrayed by their rulers – an elitist and “arrogant 
bunch of oppressive kleptocrats” who, in much of the region, are “worse than the 
European colonialists.” Africa, he notes, “has been hijacked by gangsters, crooks, and 
scoundrels,” and has become a continent where government officials do not serve the 
people, and where “anyone with an official designation can pillage at will.”142 The 
infamous excesses of such vicious tyrants as Mobutu and Bokassa, he suggests, are 
mere manifestations of a wider problem that has bedevilled the continent since 
independence.143 One of these, he notes, is the systematic undermining of State 
institutions by the region’s rulers as a way of strengthening their own grip on power. 
Thus, although every country in the region has a judicial system, their primary 
purpose is to serve the interests of the elite, while violating the basic rights of the 
poor.144   
¶47 For van de Walle, Africa’s state of “permanent crisis” stems simply from 
“neopatrimonialism,” an essentially client list approach to governance which relies on 
a system of “favors” and “privileged access to public resources;” an inherently corrupt 
system in which the traditional divide between the public and private spheres has 
become blurred, and which forms the basis of policy choices that ultimately result in 
economic chaos.145 This, he argues, has in turn created an “aid -dependency 
syndrome,” as donor agencies attempt to fill the gap, often assuming the roles of 
government in many respects, with the result that “[b]y the early 1990s, Africa’s 
relationship with the international economy was almost entirely mediated by public 
aid flows.”146 
¶48 What makes the above two views so instructive is the fact that although there is 
no evidence of collaboration between the authors, they both point to a single factor: 
the catastrophic failure of leadership. 147  Both also validate an earlier study by the 
World Bank, which reached a similar conclusion: “It is in sub-Saharan Africa that the 
deterioration in the state’s effectiveness has been most severe – the result of eroding 
civil service wages, heavy dependence on aid, and patronage politics.”148 The study 
also notes that the majority now have lower “state capability” than they did at 
independence, adding, “[a]n institutional vacuum of significant proportions has 
emerged in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, leading to increased crime and an 
absence of security, affecting investment and growth.”149   
A. Africa’s Misrule: Its Unique Features 
¶49 Elitist exploitation is not a peculiarly African problem; it could, after all, be 
argued that every society in the world is ruled by some kind of elitist clique, at least 
                                                 
142  See AYITTEY, supra note 140, at 129, 151. 
143  Id. at 136, 150.  Bokassa is believed to have squandered up to $20 million or 20 percent of his 
country’s GNP to crown himself “Emperor” of the Central A frican Republic, while Mobutu is said to 
have stolen up to $15 billion from his country’s treasury. 
144  Id. at 126-132. Indeed, he illustrates this with examples from his native Ghana, showing a clear 
pattern in the unequal dispensation of criminal justice between the rich and the poor. 
145  See VAN DE WALLE, supra  note 76, at 50. 
146  Id. at 189-220. 
147  An IMF study also mentions such factors as rapid population growth, armed conflicts, inadequate 
infrastructure, political instability, all of which are attributable to poor leadership. See CALAMITSIS ET 
AL, supra   note 68. 
148  See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, supra  note 88, at 162. 
149  Id. Whether investment and growth should be placed above human development has, of course, 
always been debatable. And although human rights advocates have traditionally favoured the latter, the 
point remains that whichever path Africa chooses, it cannot achieve development (however defined) 
without effective institutions and basic infrastructure. 
 
  
insofar as it pursues an agenda that is not primarily or exclusively in the interest of the 
people it governs. For example, the Bush Administration in the United States, like 
many of its predecessors, is believed to be deeply beholden to certain corporate 
interests through an inherently corrupt party funding system which makes a nonsense 
of America’s claim of being a truly representative democracy. 150  Neither are 
dictatorial regimes an African invention. As highlighted by Wade Mansell, 
dictatorships are not respecters of geography. 151 Indeed, almost without exception, the 
entire Arab world is ruled by some of the most corrupt regimes in history. Nor is 
brutality an exclusively African preoccupation. For every Idi Amin in Africa, there 
has been a Pol Pot in Asia, or a Hitler in Europe. Moreover, kleptocratic misrule is 
hardly an exclusively African phenomenon. For every Mobutu or Abacha, the world 
has witnessed the Marcoses, a Samoza, or the Ceausescus  – just a few examples of 
rulers who regarded their countries’ wealth as their own personal assets. Indeed, a 
recent Channel 4 television programme revealed that Edward Shevardnadze’s Georgia 
was ridden with graft, with aid funds being appropriated by government officials and 
drug enforcement agents dealing in the very substances they were supposed to be 
confiscating. 152  Moreover, a recent and rare first-hand account of life in North Korea 
under the macabre tyranny of Kim Jong Il by a former official of the aid organization, 
World Vision, reveals that very few African rulers can match this regime in terms of 
its ability, not just to deny basic human rights to its people, but to also control their 
very thoughts and daily lives through a bizarre and thoroughly dehumanizing socio -
political experiment called “Juche”.153 Indeed, a recent BBC documentary, “This 
World”, also revealed, among other violations, the starvation of its citizens by the 
regime, as well as credible accounts of routine testing of chemical and biological 
agents on the inmates at its secret Prison Camp 22, the victims including women, and 
children. 154 Even poverty itself is evidently not a uniquely African experience, at least 
insofar as it exists, albeit in relative terms, even in the richest societies of the world.  
¶50 What makes the African experience unique, however, is a combination of 
internal and external factors. Internally, there is amongst African rulers themselves a 
definite, cult- like determination to preserve the status quo, complete with the ritual of 
annual OAU (now AU) “summits,” the purposes of which are only understood by “the 
brotherhood.”155 Indeed, the very idea of the AU, with its infinite list of impressive 
aims – such as the establishment of the “Pan-African Parliament”, the “Court of 
Justice” and certain “Financial Institutions” – made up of the African Central Bank, 
the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank 156  – not to mention 
some twenty nine other “Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Charters”, is based, like 
the tenets of secret cults, on an a belief in scientific impossibilities. It is, after all, 
logically impossible to create such supranational institutions from the economic and 
                                                 
150  See Douglas Waller, Campaign Finance: Lo oking for the Loopholes , TIME, Feb. 25, 2002; Karen 
Tumulty, Bush in the Glare, TIME, Jan. 21 2002. 
151  See Wade Mansell, Legal Aspects of International Debt, 18 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 381, 384 (1991).   
152  These and other revelations were shown on television before Shevardnadze was ousted from power.  
See  Jonathan Miller, 1900 Hours News Programme , Dec. 2, 2003.  
153  See ANDREW S. NATSIOS, THE GREAT NORTH KOREAN FAMINE : FAMINE, POLITICS, AND FOREIGN 
POLICY (2002).  
154  The programme, titled “Access to Evil” was presented by Olenka Frenkiel, and was aired between 
2100 and 2200 hours on the 1st of February 2004, on BBC 2. 
155  Judging, at the very least, from the above statement attributed to Sekou Toure of Guinea which 
raises questions as to what else such summits were meant for.  See  UMOZURIKE, supra note 26. 
156See  CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION, July 11, 2000 (Adopted by the Thirty-Sixth 




political shambles that currently constitute the various member-states of the “Union.” 
Political gimmickry may be an intrinsic feature of international relations (and in this 
respect, the AU may not be different from the Arab League) but nowhere else in the 
world has it been turned, effectively, into a development strategy. 
¶51 The other level at which this cult-like solidarity manifests itself is in regard to 
political – and by extension, economic – accountability, where the notion of an 
“African solution” trumps every other consideration. A reaffirmation of the insidious 
notion of cultural relativism at its worst, this mindset has little room for victims of 
human rights violations.  
¶52 Two examples illustrate this point.  First, in spite of the fact that Mugabe’s 
conduct has violated every known aspect of African culture, not to mention 
internationally recognized human rights norms, no African ruler has been willing to 
condemn him to date. On the contrary, their conduct at recent Commonwealth 
summits simply confirms their determination to preserve “the brotherhood” at the 
expense of everything else. 157  Indeed, even Nelson Mandela’s own successor, Thabo 
Mbeki, has not concealed his anger at the international community for criticizing 
Mugabe. He is reported to have stated recently: “The land question has disappeared 
from the global discourse about Zimbabwe, except...to highlight the plight of former 
white landowners.”158 So determined has Mbeki been to strengthen (and broaden) “the 
brotherhood” that he recently travelled to Haiti, where he reportedly spent 
$1.5million, effectively celebrating the kleptocratic despotism of the now exiled Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. 159 And from all indications, he was even prepared to extend 
military support to that regime.160 The attitude of the AU could be contrasted with that 
of the Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries, which, although not 
composed of quintessential democrats, has demonstrated its willingness to emancipate 
their citizen from poverty, as noted earlier. 161  
¶53 The evident contempt for human r ights by African rulers has in turn prompted 
near-palpable cynicism from some Western leaders, who appear to regard even the 
most atrocious amongst the former as a “partner” in the development of the 
continent. 162  This was much in evidence at a conference organized by President 
                                                 
157  See African Body Slams Commonwealth, BBC NEWS, December 9, 2003, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3304461.stm. A veteran African observer puts it thus: 
“...solidarity among Africa's rulers remains more important than the pledges they have made to good 
government, democracy and respect for human rights.” See Richard Dowden, Why Blair's missionary  
message flopped with African leaders, OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 2002, available  at  
http://www.observer.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4496678,00.html. 
158  See 'Commonwealth Bias' Angers Mbeki, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2003 (UK edition) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3312991.stm.  
159  Mbeki’s explanation was that his trip “ …was an important sign of solidarity with the world's first 
black-led republic and a step towards cementing ties between Africa and communities of the African 
diaspora.”  See Haitians Shoot at Mbeki's Chopper , BBC NEWS, Jan. 2, 2004 (UK edition) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3363317.stm. 
160  See Haiti Arms Row Rocks South Africa, BBC NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004 (UK edition) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3513006.stm. 
161   Indeed, even the Arab League, which is not entirely d issimilar to the AU in many respects, has been 
willing to isolate the likes of Gaddafi and Saddam, even if not on known human rights grounds. 
162  “Cynicism” because it could be argued that the occasional photo opportunity between a Western 
leader and an African ruler (despot or not) gives their domestic constituency the impression that 
“something is being done” for the people of Africa. Moreover, as noted by Human Rights Watch, the 
“tradition of competitive foreign policies toward Africa” between the French and UK governments 
(both of which have significant input in the EU’s foreign policy towards the region) has, over the years, 
dictated that one government’s African pariah becomes the other’s ally. Hence, while the British 
government was condemning Mugabe’s atrocities (even if merely rhetorically), the French played host 
to the tyrant. See World Report 2002: Africa Overview, supra  note 69.  
 
  
Chirac of France on the region titled “Africa and France, Together in Their New 
Partnership,” to which every ruler on the continent – except leaderless Somalia’s – 
was invited. Even Mugabe was also invited, in spite of a supposed EU-wide travel 
ban.163 In any event, African rulers had reportedly threatened to boycott the 
conference if Mugabe was excluded.164 Thus, a coincidence of selfish interests 
between the French government and African despots took precedence over every 
other consideration, including the need to isolate rulers who evidently constitute an 
impediment to the realization of the basic needs of the people of the region.  
¶54 To be sure, the French government does not operate in isolation. British Premier 
Tony Blair also appears determined to safeguard this “partnership” regardless of the 
outcome: In a speech delivered with characteristic messianic zeal, he told his Labour 
party activists in October of 2001 that Africa was “a scar on the conscience of the 
world” which needed to be “healed.” “A partnership for Africa...based around the 
New African Initiative” he added, “is there to be done if we find the will.”165  What 
has become of that “partnership” three years afterwards remains to be explained. In 
the meantime, the Prime Minister has set up a new Commission for Africa, whose role 
“will be a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Africa and policies towards 
Africa.”166 Indeed, the word “partnership” was more recently echoed, with equal 
passion, by his former International Development Secretary, Baroness Amos 
(currently leader of the House of Lords) in a radio debate, in response to a suggestion 
that Africa is, more than anything else, a casualty of bad government.167  Nor are these 
Western leaders alone in this cynical enterprise. A visit to the websites of various 
multilateral agencies (including the UN’s) reveals an apparently obligatory obsession 
with the idea of a “partnership” with these rulers.168 The neo-conservative American 
think-tank, the Heritage Foundation, may not have much to offer in terms of solutions 
to Africa’s problems (except perhaps for the much discredited SAPs or its variants); 
but a description, by one of its commentators, of the region as “a playground for spoilt 
despots wreaking havoc on their fiefdoms” could not be more appropriate.169 
¶55 In criticising the nature of the relationship between international actors and 
African rulers, it is necessary to acknowledge that these same actors are also actively 
                                                 
163  Further information on the conference, including speeches, are available at the French Embassy’s 
website at  http://www.info -france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2003/franceafrica_summit.asp. The 
conference took place between February 19th and 21st 2003. 
164  See Alex Lefebvre, Franco-African Summit: The Scramble for Africa Intensifies , World Socialist 
Web Site (WSWS), March 3, 2003.  Available  at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/mar2003/summ- 
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165  Prime Minister Tony Blair, Part One of the Speech by Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at the Labour 
Party Conference (Oct. 2, 2001) (transcript available at 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour2001/story/0,1414,562006,00.html). 
166  See PM Launches Commission for Africa, DIRECT GOV, Feb. 26, 2004, available at 
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167  Any Questions: The Royal Society of Arts, London 250th Anniversary Panel, BBC Radio 4 
broadcast, Mar. 19, 2004. 
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IN REVIEW: ANNUAL REPORT 2002, The World Bank Group, at www.worldbank.org/annual 
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(June 12, 2001). 
169  See Nile Gardiner, A New Vision for Africa: Web Memo #307, The Heritage Foundation: Web 
Memo, at www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/wm307.cfm (July 3, 2003).       
 
  
engaged with obnoxious regimes the world over. Successive US Administrations, for 
example, have been unflinching allies of the decadent and repressive Saudi dynasty 
for many decades, as have their British counterparts. The United Nations, for its part, 
has maintained a presence in various countries with questionable human rights 
regimes – and appropriately so, given its human rights mandate.170 Thus, on the 
surface, it could be argued that engagement by the international community with 
African despots is not unique. However, this would ignore the very nature of these 
relationships: As well as being premised on cynicism, they are also based on what 
might be called deliberate ignorance. This almost certainly stems from the fact that, in 
general, very few of these actors ever attempt to understand the political, sociological, 
and indeed the economic environments in which they operate. So much, after all, has 
been acknowledged by the World Bank’s former Chief Economist who has offered an 
insight into the astonishingly cavalier and routine manner in which its sister 
organization,  the IMF, conducts its business. 171  This, moreover, is the theme of 
Graham Hancock’s widely-cited book, Lords of Poverty, which highlights how 
virtually no consideration is given by aid donors to its supposed beneficiaries. 172 It 
follows that in the context of SSA, their policies are inexorably premised upon a 
misreading of the relationship between the victims of poverty and their ruling elites. 
The selfish interests of Africa’s ruling elites, it appears, are the same as those of the 
region’s longsuffering peop le. How else can one explain the fact that African rulers 
continue to receive foreign aid of every description (so much so that the region has 
become the most aid -dependent in the world),173 without such inflows being strictly 
conditional upon the extent to which they are channelled towards poverty 
alleviation?174 
¶56 Ignorance of Africa on the part of international actors is also influenced by a 
debilitating kind of political correctness – a patronizing of interests fuelled by a desire 
not to be seen to be critical of rulers who are invariably considered to be victims of 
colonial or some other injustice. Again, this attitude does not recognize the evident 
distinction between the region’s rulers and their selfish interests, and the real victims 
of economic misery. As pointed out by Ayittey, to do so would be seen as “blaming 
the victim.”175 The upshot of this attitude is that whereas the odious regime in Saudi 
Arabia, for example, is condemned for what it is, and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea a 
subject of universal derision or opprobrium, African dictatorships are seen as 
“partners.” It also explains the fact that although many commentators are willing to 
                                                 
170  See UN Charter, supra note 23, preamble to art. 55 and 56. 
171  See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 23-24 (2002). 
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note 76, at 220. 
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blame Kim Jong Il, for example, for his people’s suffering, criticisms of African 
rulers are often invariably tempered with references to so-called exogenous factors. 
¶57 Moreover, this uncritical engagement has spawned what might be called an 
“initiatives industry,” with international actors seemingly determined to match, and in 
most cases, surpass, every escapist antic embarked upon by African rulers. 176  It comes 
as no surprise, therefore, that Africa has become the most aid -dependent region in the 
world, while the basic needs of its people have remained at best largely ignored by 
both sides in this cynical enterprise, as effort s are intensified towards preserving the 
“partnership.” This is one area in which there needs to be radical change if ordinary 
Africans are ever to begin to enjoy the basic rights proclaimed under the ICESCR. 
B. Economic Rights Violations: An Instrument of Despotic Misrule 
¶58 Much, of course, has been written on SSA, and from various disciplinary 
perspectives. Regrettably, this vast literature mainly articulates the region’s problems 
in terms of either the consequences of an unfair, neo- liberal global trading regime or 
of poor policy choices – usually a euphemism for the non-adoption of exclusively 
neo-liberal economic policies. 177  Even within the context of human rights advocacy, 
violations of civil and political rights have traditionally been given priority over 
violations of economic rights, although it is necessary to acknowledge that this 
appears to be changing. 178 This means that the benefits accruing from violations of 
economic rights to African rulers have received very little or no attention. 179  
¶59 This, however, is not difficult to understand: the traditional (if fictional) 
separation of the two categories of human rights aside, it is easier to explain why the 
violation of civil and political rights might serve a despot’s interests – primarily, his 
determination to remain in power – than it is to comprehend how his violation of 
economic rights might serve the same purpose. A clampdown on freedom of 
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Framework; the Special Facility for Africa (SFA) (later replaced by the Special Programme of 
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expression, 180 for example, is a tried and tested means of stifling debate – and thus of 
popular agitation for change – just as the denial of participatory rights181  by a one-
party regime eliminates effective political opposition.  
¶60 On the contrary, it could be argued that because the denial of the rights to food 
or healthcare might engender a sense of marginalization and provoke a popular 
revolution, this cannot serve the same purpose as denials of civil and political rights. 
The recent uprising against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti, and his ignominious flight 
from the country might indeed be cited as a case in point. But then, in the case of 
Haiti, the impact of pressure from the American and French governments, above 
anything else, cannot be discounted as the deciding factor. Indeed, it is reported that 
he was “bundled on to a plane” by US troops.182 With no such geographical proximity 
(and hence, an immediate threat from refugees) to the United States, SSA remains in 
an entirely different position. At any rate, a combination of illiteracy, poverty, hunger, 
homelessness and disease has rendered its people simply incapable of demanding 
political and economic change. African rulers have therefore come to appreciate their 
utility – hence, their preference for escapist gimmickry, such as NEPAD or the 
hopelessly grandiose aims of the AU, as a substitute for simple, practical steps a imed 
at poverty alleviation. Economic emancipation therefore represents as much a threat 
to despotism as freedom of expression, or the right to participate in “genuine periodic 
elections” as envisaged under the ICCPR.183 It thus becomes possible to assert that in 
much of Africa, poverty is not simply an unfortunate state of affairs, nor, as is often 
suggested, a consequence of globalization or other factors; it is, on the contrary, an 
effective means of mass disempowerment by rulers whose only concern is the 
exercise of power without the attendant responsibilities.184 The same is true of 
Africa’s endless wars, which, aside from the direct material benefits that often flow 
from them, 185 remove any vestiges of accountability, and make the ruler’s position 
unassailab le. They also make it possible to embark on a “rights violating spree,” 
including the commission of such horrific crimes as rape, mutilations, and the 
conscription of child soldiers; thereby making it unnecessary to build hospitals or 
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14, whose report names Uganda’s Museveni, Rwanda’s Kagame, and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe as the main 
culprits. A World Bank report also highlights the allure of personal gains in the Liberian conflict: 
Initially, the war was  caused by social and political factors, with control over the central government as 
the main objective. However, “...control over Liberia’s rich natural resources and  other assets, in 
addition to being a means of ensuring funding for the war, has become an end in itself...” See  WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, supra  note 88, at 160.  
 
  
schools, not to mention the basic State institutions and infrastructure, without which 
no governmental functions can take place.  
C. Somalia: Experimenting With Mobocracy 
¶61 Current developments in Somalia offer what is arguably the best illustration of 
how leadership has been the impediment to Africa’s economic emancipation. Somalia 
has not only become a failed State in every imaginable respect, but is almost certainly 
the only “mobocracy” in the world. But Somalia’s collapse did not happen by 
accident. Since becoming independent in 1960, it was plagued by warlordism. 186 The 
post-independence regime was overthrown in 1969 by a man called Siad Barre, under 
whom the country became a pawn in the Cold War rivalry. In the meantime, 
expansionist ambitions on the part of Barre saw the country at war with neighbouring 
Ethiopia in an attempt to create a “Greater Somaliland,” although the massive aid – 
first from the Soviet Union, later from the United States, and then from the Italian 
Socialists – it had received never reached its people. The economy, needless to add, 
was already in ruins by 1980 when the IMF intervened. 187 In the meantime, every sign 
of protest was met with brutal repression. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
Barre regime “unleashed a reign of terror against [civilians of the Isaaq clan] killing 
50,000 to 60,000 between May 1988 and January 1990.”188 The collapse of the 
country in the 1990s was therefore a near-certainty. 
¶62 What makes Somalia particularly instructive in relation to the African tragedy is 
the fact that it is is, astonishingly, now enjoying a degree of stability that even its 
previous rulers were unable – or unwilling – to bring about. In what must be one of 
the most perverse political and economic developments in history, the prevalent 
anarchy has even spawned a thriving multi-purpose company called al-Barakaat, 
which had once grown to became the largest employer in the country, its interests 
including banking, postal services and telecommunications, with a shareholding of 
600.189  Of late, other developments have been noted in areas such as livestock 
production, road building, water and electricity. Media houses have in fact also 
sprung up. 190  And although clan warfare and mob rule remain central features of 
daily life, a BBC source notes that “[t]he country has one of the most dynamic 
economies in the East African region and is effectively an economy without a 
state."191 In one sense, it is possible to dismiss these developments simply as a bizarre 
fluke, the dynamics of which cannot yet be known, not least because this would be 
impossible in a state of literal anarchy. If and when normality ensues, future research 
would almost certainly offer a more revealing insight. This, however, would ignore 
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one important point: that given the right kind of leadership (and one capable o f giving 
vent to the ingenuity already demonstrated by the Somali people), their level of 
economic development can only be imagined. Indeed, the very fact that so much has 
emerged from this tragic chaos serves as an eternal indictment against certain so-
called governments on the continent of Africa. 
VI. A HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION? 
¶63 Assuming, therefore, that leadership constitutes the obstacle to the realization of 
human rights in Africa, this invariably raises questions regarding what measures 
might be appropriate as a way of emancipating its longsuffering people. In proposing 
a “human rights solution,” it is recognized that law is merely one possible means of 
effecting the desired change. It is, after all, the case that concerted political pressure, 
for example, might prove more effective: As noted in Part V, it was political pressure 
from the United States and France which, more than anything else, brought the 
Aristide misrule in Haiti to its belated end. Indeed, an essentially economic measure 
could be just as effective: the imposition of targeted sanctions against individual 
actors within a rights-violating regime, which should necessarily involve the 
confiscation of stolen State assets (and their proceeds), would make a Mobutu or an 
Abacha-style “rule by theft” inherently unprofitable for those concerned. Regrettably, 
neither of these can be considered a realistic possibility: A Haiti-style solution, for 
example, would have to be repeated in over 40 different countries on the continent, 
while the kind of targeted sanctions envisaged would certainly be resisted by the 
powerful Western banking institutions in which the stolen funds are hidden. 192  At any 
rate, given that this is primarily a law-based critique – not to mention the fact that 
political will on the part of the international community to adopt the above measures 
is simply non-existent – only the legal possibilities will be explored. 
¶64 As of March 2003, the majority of countries in SSA had ratified the two 
Covenants.193  By so doing, African rulers, like other world leaders, explicitly pledged 
themselves to the realization of the rights proclaimed therein.194 Indeed, even within 
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the context of customary international law, the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development, for example, explicitly identifies the State as the primary guarantor of 
human rights.195 Thus, any examination of the problems faced by the region must 
necessarily begin with an acknowledgement of the legal obligations that its rulers 
have voluntarily undertaken, a deliberate breach of which should serve as a 
convenient basis for the sanctions to be examined. Before exploring such legal 
remedies, however, it is pertinent to acknowledge that an attempt to invoke them 
would not be unproblematic, although as will be shown later, these in themselves are 
not insurmountable obstacles. 
A. The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations 
¶65 The first of these apparent obstacles relates to the nature of States Parties’ 
obligations as spelled out under the ICESCR itself: to “take steps...to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view of achieving progressively the full realization” of 
economic rights.196 A number of related problems immediately spring to mind in this 
regard, the first being the indeterminate nature of the phrase “to the maximum of its 
available resources.” This inherent vagueness means that it lends itself very easily to 
subjective interpretation, especially by regimes intent on keeping their citizens in 
perpetual misery. Indeed, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter the Committee)197 alluded to this possibility by noting that this concept is 
often treated by governments merely as a statement of intent, as opposed to “a 
necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the 
difficulties involved for any co untry in ensuring full realization of [economic 
rights].”198 The Committee however went on to explain that Article 2(1) “imposes an 
obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.”199  
Interestingly, various experts on this subject, acting in concert with certain interested 
parties, including the UN Centre for Human Rights, had earlier proclaimed the much-
cited Limburg Principles (and ten years later, the Maastricht Guidelines) echoing 
similar views in an attempt to explain the nature of States Parties obligations. 200   
                                                                                                                                           
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant...” See also  ICESCR, supra note 194, Art.2, “[e]ach State 
party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation...to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” 
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196  See ICESR, supra  note 193, Art.2(1). 
197  The Committee was created by a Resolution of the UN’s Economic and Social Council (See 
ECOSOC Res. 1985/17 of 28 May 1985, as cited in United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Annual Sessions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Resolution 1995/39, 52nd 
plenary meeting, 25 July 1995. 
198  See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature of 
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¶66 But how, it might be asked, are countries that are too poor to realize these 
rights, supposed to take steps to realize them? There is little doubt that at first sight, 
this apparent contradiction seems as self-explanatory as the basic legal maxim: nemo 
dat quod non habet – one, after all, cannot give that which he does not have. This, 
however, must not be the end of the argument, not least because the question of 
resources can itself become a most convenient excuse for egregious violations. At any 
rate, as explained within the Limburg Principles, “[t] he obligation of progressive 
achievement exists independently of the increase in resources; it requires effective use 
of resources available.”201 Moreover, in its Human Development Report  for the year 
1990, the United Nations Development Programme stated: “Developing countries are 
not too poor to pay for human development...Most budgets can...accommodate 
additional spending on human development by reorienting national priorities...”202  
The report cites defence spending as one area where countries tend to waste their 
scarce resources.203 To this could be added the “white elephant” projects and blatant 
misuse of public funds on the part of African rulers (some of which are outlined in 
Part III). Thus, this apparently insurmountable problem can be mitigated by a simple 
reordering of priorities by governments in the region. 
¶67 The second problem relating to the nature of States Parties’ obligations is that 
an international tribunal (of the kind envisaged herein) charged with determining 
whether a ruler of a poor country has violated his people’s right to food, for example, 
might wonder whether this is not an essentially economic question, 204  as opposed to 
one involving a breach of international law. What is being proposed in this article, 
however, is not the indictment of every ruler for every violation of every right 
proclaimed under the ICESCR, just as the International Criminal Court, for example, 
is not mandated to adjudicate on every violation of every right under the ICCPR.205 
Nor would a single case of malaria, even if caused by a failure to provide essential 
drugs in hospitals, necessarily result in an indictment. On the contrary, what is 
envisaged is conduct that results in the scale of suffering of the kind highlighted at the 
outset. Much, therefore, would depend on the severity and scale of the violation(s) 
alleged: The conduct of the accused must have been so objectively blameworthy, and 
the harm in question so easily avoidable that it could reasonably be held to have been 
a flagrant violation of not just the relevant right under the ICESCR, but also of the 
right to human dignity which, after all, is the very essence of human rights, as 
proclaimed under the various international instruments. 206 In other words, a broad 
liability threshold would have to be established, to be mitigated only by a “best 
endeavour” defence on the part of the accused. 
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¶68 The third apparent obstacle in regard to the nature of States Parties’ obligations 
is the very notion of “progressive realization” itself, which invariably entails 
extensive data accumulation and analysis, a task which poor countries with inadequate 
manpower, institutions and infrastructure cannot hope to accomplish, and which 
therefore arguably defeats the essence of the notion itself. Indeed, it was in the light of 
this that a former Rapporteur to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights 
proposed her much-cited “violations approach,” based, as she explains, on the existing 
monitoring processes o f other human rights instruments.207 Moreover, as pointed out 
by Steiner and Alston, the monitoring of economic rights is “especially challenging” 
because of “the scope of the rights, the diversity of the means by which they might be 
made operational, and the inevitably complex relationship between rights and 
resources.”208 From a legal perspective, they assert, the challenge is how to reconcile, 
through the monitoring process, the notion of progressive realization with the 
practicalities of resource constraint s, while acknowledging the dramatic disparities in 
financial and administrative capacities between countries. 209  Yet, as the concept itself 
suggests, what is envisaged is not the immediate realization of universal standards 
applicable to every right proclaimed by the ICESCR. On the contrary, what is 
required is a serious attempt on the part of governments to realize these rights, 
beginning with the most fundamental ones, particularly those relating to basic human 
needs. This, after all, would explain the reliance, by the Committee, on the so-called 
“minimum core content” approach, focusing on the realization of such basic rights as 
food, healthcare, housing, and education. 210 An individual complaints procedure 
broadly similar to that which already exists under the First Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR is also being proposed. 211 It thus becomes possible to argue that these 
difficulties, at the very worst, are in no sense dissimilar to those that exist within other 
international human rights instruments. 
B. The Language of the ICESCR 
¶69 The language employed by the drafters of the ICESCR is widely believed to be 
merely exhortatory and therefore non-binding.212 Indeed, even some renowned 
international lawyers who are known advocates of economic rights have raised 
questions regarding the extent to which the Covenant lends itself to effective 
enforcement.213 Whether such a material difference exists between the two Covenants 
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is however debatable, not least because most of the rights proclaimed under the 
ICCPR are not expressed in the absolute, non-derogable terms that are often ascribed 
to them: Even the right to life, for example, is only guaranteed to the extent that it is 
not infringed arbitrarily.214 At any rate, even if the ICESCR were to pose such a 
problem, this would be no more serious that those which confront the municipal 
courts from time to time; hence, the development of well-established rules of 
interpretation, particularly in the common law world. For example, where a literal 
interpretation would result in an absurdity, judges have always been at liberty adopt 
the “golden rule,” or its close variant, the “mischief rule,” which gives an intended 
effect to the instrument215 – the “mischief” here being the need to uphold the inherent 
dignity of the human person as proclaimed in the Preambles to the two Covenants). 
Indeed, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties offers useful guidance in this 
regard by stipulating that a treaty “be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose”216 [emphasis added]. There is therefore a danger of 
overstating the significance of this apparent difference, thus accentuating a fictional 
distinction between rights that have, after all, been universally recognized as 
interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible.217 
C. The Question of Enforcement218 
¶70 As already pointed out, the “enforcement” of economic rights as such takes 
place through the process of supervision by above Committee, which merely monitors 
the extent to which its States Parties claim to have realized the rights proclaimed 
within it,219 particularly through the mechanism of State reporting – a process which, 
by all accounts (and amongst other flaws), relies entirely on the goodwill and sincerity 
of the very governments that stand accused of the violations in question. It was, after 
all, a veteran of the same Committee who, reflecting on how it might be seen by a lay 
person, once described it as: “...a system that makes governments entirely responsible 
for reporting on themselves, once every five years, subject to soft questioning for a 
few hours by cautious committees, elected by those very governments, and with 
almost no likelihood of serious censure or sanctions.”220 
                                                                                                                                           
RTS. Q. 331, 351 (1991); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 576-577 (5th ed. 
1999). 
214  See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
215  See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW  99-102 (8th ed. 1969).  
216  Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 8 I.L.M. 
679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added).  
217  See also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]; ; U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, PROCLAMATION OF TEHERAN at ¶ 13, U.N. Sales No.E.68.XIV.2, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/b_tehern.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
PROCLAMATION OF TEHERAN]. The Proclamation of Teheran states, “Since human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without the 
enjoyment of  economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.” Id. 
218  The term “enforcement” is perhaps inappropriate when examining the two Covenants (and indeed, 
many other international human rights instruments), given the non-coercive approach that is often 
employed. Nevertheless, this term is commonly used, not least by renowned international lawyers.  See, 
e.g.,,  BROWNLIE,  supra  note 213,  at 536. 
219  The Committee is a subsidiary of the UN’s Economic and Social Council and derives its authority 
from it, by virtue of the latter’s Resolution. See E.S.C. Res. 1995/39, U.N. ESCOR, 52d Sess., plen. 
mtg. ¶ 2, (1995), available at  http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc /res/1995/eres1995-39.htm (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2004).  
220  Scott Leckie, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Catalyst for Change in a 
System Needing Reform, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 129, 130  (Philip 
 
  
¶71 However, the absence of a more effective mechanism for their enforcement 
should in no sense imply their unenforceability in a coercive sense. Indeed, as will be 
shown in this section, there are instructive precedents in this regard, both under 
municipal and international law. In any event, the ICESCR is not unique in not having 
its own coercive internal enforcement mechanism. An examination of the ICCPR 
reveals that it has no such mechanism either. 221  Yet, such internal limitations have 
been shown to constitute no bar to the  effective enforcement of the rights recognized 
under the ICCPR. The establishment, by the UN Security Council, of ad- hoc tribunals 
for the prosecution of individuals accused of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia 222 and Rwanda223 serve as examples of 
how such internal instrumental limitations can be overcome, while the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court puts this ad-hoc approach (though primarily to the 
enforcement of civil and political rights) on a permanent basis. 224  Indeed, the fact that 
the UK authorities were legally obliged (by virtue of the Torture Convention) 225  to 
arrest and examine the possibility of extraditing Pinochet to Spain on allegations of 
torture was further illustration of this reality, 226  although this must now be read in 
light of a decision by the International Court of Justice concerning a Congolese 
foreign minister accused of violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of crimes 
against humanity. 227  What these demonstrate, nevertheless, is that there are no 
conceptual or practical obstacles to holding State officials to account for grave 
violations of economic rights in the manner envisaged, albeit only after they would 
have left office, provided the political will exists at the international level.  
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D. The Problem of National Sovereignty 
¶72 The vexed question of national sovereignty poses a real obstacle to the 
indictment and punishment of rulers who violate their people’s economic rights. 
Arguably the cornerstone of international relations, it is rooted in Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State...” What this means is that governments that, as noted in Part 
IV, are notoriously resistant to external scrutiny are even less likely to be receptive to 
any interference in regard to matters that are essentially economic. Indeed, they may 
even invoke their right to self-determination as guaranteed under the two Covenants 
with some justification. 228 Moreover, although developments post-WWII have 
consistently shown that national sovereignty represents no bar to external scrutiny 
where serious human rights violations are alleged, such developments have primarily 
(and almost exclusively) been confined to the broad sphere of civil and political 
rights.229 Thus, any attempt to extend them to economic rights would, prima facie, be 
breaking new ground.  
¶73 Paradoxically, however, these same post-war developments also suggest that 
indictments for violations of economic rights would not necessarily involve such a 
radical change, conceptual or practical. For example, whether by design or by default, 
even the UN Security Council has explicitly invoked its powers under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter to prevent what were essentially, though by no means exclusively, 
violations of economic rights in certain countries, Somalia being a prime example. 230  
Indeed, it could be argued that any intervention on humanitarian grounds is essentially 
aimed at protecting the economic rights of those affected, at least insofar as such 
Resolutions include a mandate to guarantee the delivery of emergency relief such as 
food, shelter and medical care. The principle, therefore, is that where violations are 
considered to pose a threat to international peace and security, the sovereignty of the 
State concerned becomes an irrelevant consideration.  
E. The Question of Liability by Omission 
¶74 One further apparent problem with an indictment for violations of economic 
rights would be the fact that the very nature of the rights proclaimed under the 
ICESCR strongly suggests that liability would be incurred mainly by way of an 
omission, and not by positive conduct. Indeed, the Limburg Principles employ the 
term “failure” in describing what amounts to a violation of economic rights.231 The 
question, therefore, is whether the notion of criminal liability by omission is a known 
concept in international law. A good starting point would be a brief consideration of 
                                                 
228   Arts.1(1) common to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which proclaim the right of peoples to inter 
alia, “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” ICCPR, supra note 2, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 173; ICESCR, supra note 2, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.   
229  For an insightful account of this gradual evolution, see Nigel S. Rodley, The Evolution of United  
Nations’ Charter-Based Machinery for the Protection of Human Rights  1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 4 
(1997).  
230  See S. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, X Sess., 3188th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993). Of particular 
note is paragraph 4,which “[r]equests the Secretary -General...to provide humanitarian and other 
assistance to the people of Somalia...”). Id . A similar Resolution recognizes that “the restoration of law 
and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations...” S. Res. 837, U.N. 
SCOR, X Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993). 
231  Indeed, the Limburg Principles employ the term “failure” in describing what amounts to a violation 
of the ICESCR. See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra  note 200, at ¶¶ 70-73.  
 
  
English law, where this principle has had a long history. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the general principle is that liability can flow from an omission, 
provided it can be shown that the accused had a duty of care (an obligation not 
dissimilar to those undertaken by governments under Article 2 of the ICESCR) 
towards the victim. By a remarkable coincidence, many of the judicial authorities in 
this regard relate to aspects of economic rights. 232  The most authoritative decision to 
date is R v Adomako,233 where the House of Lords upheld a conviction for gross 
negligence manslaughter, because the accused, an anaesthetist, had treated his patient 
(to whom he obviously owed a duty of care) in a manner that was considered to be 
abysmally below what could reasonably be expected of a physician of his experience. 
In other words, he had failed to exercise this duty to the standard expected of a person 
with his skills and experience. 
¶75 At the international level, the relevant authorities are to be found in the areas of 
international criminal or humanitarian law, where the position is not dissimilar to that 
under English law. As pointed out by a former judge (and later, President) of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “[i]nternational criminal 
liability may arise not only as a result of a positive act...but also from an omission, 
that is, failure to take action...when the law imposed a clear obligation to act and the 
person wilfully or recklessly failed to do what was legally required.”234 Examples 
cited include the duties imposed by various provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 governing the conduct of parties during armed conflict, breaches of which 
constitute violations of the law of war.235 Indeed, duties very similar to those 
undertaken under the ICESCR can be found under the Second Geneva Convention, 
which provides that enemy combatants who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked “shall 
not be wilfully left without medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions exposing 
them to contagion or infection be created.”236  Even more remarkable are Articles 55 
and 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which impose an obligation on an 
Occupying Power to provide food, medical supplies, public health and hygiene to the 
civilian population “to the fullest extent of the means available,”237  and Article 69(1) 
of the First Additional Protocol which obliges an Occupying Power to provide the 
means for satisfying the basic needs of the civilian population, again, “to the fullest 
                                                 
232  See R v Gibbins and Proctor,13 Crim. App. Rep. 134 (1918) (cohabiting partners were held liable 
for a child’s murder because they had withheld food from it); The Queen v. Instan , 1 Q.B. 450 (1893) 
(accused held liable for manslaughter following death of her helpless aunt, with whom she was living, 
for failure to feed or seek medical assistance); R v. Stone and Dobinson, Q.B. 354 (1977)  (couple held 
liable for manslaughter for failure to seek appropriate medical help for S’s sister, who had come to live 
with them, even though D, a 43 year old man, was described as “ineffectual and inadequate” and S, 67, 
was partially deaf, nearly blind, and of low intelligence). Criminal liability for omission also exists 
under statute, an example being s.19(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, under which a person commits an 
offence if he fails to disclose certain information known to him to the police, relating to the subject-
matter of the Act. See  Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 19 (Eng.). 
233  1 A.C. 171 (1995). 
234  See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 200 (2003).  
235  See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 16(4), 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 14(2), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. (which 
imposes a duty to protect prisoners of war from violence or intimidation).  
236  Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of the Armed Forc es at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12(2), 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
237  These provisions are remarkable because of its obvious similarity to the “progressive realization” 
clause of the ICESCR.  
    See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1948, arts. 55-56, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 
  
possible extent of the means availab le.”238  Violations of these instruments, it is worth 
noting, constitute war crimes. 239  These thus make it possible to argue that if breaches 
of obligations similar to those imposed by the ICESCR could attract that level of 
liability, there is indeed no excuse for not regarding breaches of the Covenant 
(particularly those relating to the “minimum core obligations” already spelled out) as 
being of the same degree of seriousness.  
¶76 The “human rights solution” proposed herein is therefore not new in any sense, 
at least insofar as clear and authoritative precedents exist both under municipal and 
international law, for punishing those who cause death or unnecessary suffering by 
omission, specifically in relation to certain basic rights now recognized within the 
ICESCR. The idea is that rulers who either deliberately  abandon their elementary 
obligations towards their citizens, or expose them, for example through massive 
corruption, to avoidable economic misery such as famine, homelessness (e.g., through 
wars, which result in mass migration), and/or disease would be treated in the same 
way as those who violate the peremptory norms of international law. This would have 
two related positive outcomes for human rights advocacy: It would reaffirm the 
importance of the core elements of economic rights to the notion of human dignity 
(without which other human rights become meaningless) and in the process, elevate 
economic rights to the level of importance that is increasingly being accorded to civil 
and political rights. This, after all, would be the only logical meaning implied by the 
various UN Declarations proclaiming the “indivisibility” and “interdependence” of 
human rights.240 
F. A “Crimes Against Humanity” Approach? 
¶77 In proposing the possible indictment of rulers for violations of economic rights, 
one commentator has persuasively advocated a “Crimes Against Humanity” approach, 
to be based on existing frameworks in international criminal law. 241  Her thesis is that 
“the definition of crimes against humanity is open-ended enough to include 
economic...rights...and the concept does not require an international conflict, but 
rather systematic and large-scale abuse for it to be triggered.”242 Of particular interest, 
amongst the various instruments cited is Article 7(k) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC Statute) which defines crimes against humanity to 
include: “other inhumane acts...intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or mental and physical health.” 
¶78 There is little doubt that the phrase “other inhumane acts...” would clearly cover 
certain violations of economic rights. For example, the infliction of bodily harm on a 
prisoner, while primarily a violation of the Torture Convention, 243 is also an 
inherently inhumane act. Indeed, very few observers would deny that this would also 
                                                 
238  Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). 
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241  See Sigrun I. S kogly, Crimes Against Humanity – Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and 
Social Rights?, 5 INT ’L J. HUM. RTS. 58 (2001). 
242  Id. at 58. 
243  See Convention Against Torture, supra  note 225.  
 
  
be a direct violation of the victim’s right to health – a core aspect of economic rights. 
Yet, the ICC Statute does not recognize violations of economic rights as such. At first 
sight, this should not pose any insurmountable difficulty, since the envisaged tribunal 
would almost certainly not be concerned with any apparent distinction between the 
two categories of rights, especially given that that would be against the established 
rules of customary international law.244 Indeed, as the above cases (Sumida Haruzo & 
others, and Gozawa Sadaichi & others) illustrate, violations of economic rights had 
been punished as war crimes even before the drafting of the ICESCR. The point to 
note, however, is that the core elements of economic rights, particularly the rights to 
food, health, and housing, are too essential to human existence and dignity to be 
treated, in effect, merely as incidental rights. 
¶79 Moreover, although the ICC Statute does not address itself explicitly and 
exclusively to crimes committed during armed conflict, the very nature of the crimes 
outlined under Articles 5-8,245  and the degree of seriousness required, 246  lend 
themselves easily (rightly or wrongly) to this interpretation. This being the case, it 
becomes safe to argue that for violations of economic rights to be punished under the 
heading of crimes against humanity, there must almost certainly have been an armed 
conflict (in which case a violation of economic rights would be considered under the 
category of “other inhumane acts”) which, in any event, excludes liability for 
omissions on a literal interpretation. Yet, although contemporary Africa has come to 
be defined by endless wars (as noted in Part III) many of the most serious violations 
of economic rights in the region take place in non-conflict situations. Moreover, 
although mass impoverishment of the kind described therein might be said to be a 
function of positive conduct (e.g., the transfer of State assets into personal accounts 
abroad), the resulting human rights violations remain, essentially, crimes of omission. 
Thus, while a “crimes against humanity approach” is undoubtedly an attractive 
proposition, it would not be adequate to deal effectively with the African status quo. 
What is being proposed herein, t herefore, is a recognition of the inherent importance 
of economic rights, either by broadening the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court by an Additional Protocol, or by the establishment of a separate tribunal for the 
same purpose. There is, in other words, a need for a degree of clarity that befits the 
nature of the rights in question, as well as the nature of the punishment envisaged. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
¶80 This article became necessary in the light of the very human tragedies that have 
defined sub-Saharan Africa since decolonization, and which continue to inflict untold 
suffering on its people even as the world begins to settle into the 21st century.  In the 
course of the critique, it became clear that contrary to common assumptions, these 
tragedies are simply the direct consequence of an inability (or unwillingness) on the 
part of its rulers to attach any degree of seriousness to their legal responsibilities 
towards their citizens. Yet, the tragic irony is that as the people of Somalia have so 
clearly demonstrated, ordinary Africans are a remarkably self-reliant and resourceful 
people – a people quite capable of liberating themselves from economic misery if 
given the chance.  
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¶81 Given, however, that they are very unlikely to be given that opportunity (for 
reasons discussed in Part V), it becomes necessary to argue that the necessary change 
would have to be initiated from outside the region, and at two levels: First, 
international actors must desist from predicating their engagement with the region’s 
rulers on the gratuitously emotive notion of a “partnership” and instead, should adopt 
a more discerning approach, with the aim of offering appropriate inducements to 
those who take their people’s rights sufficiently seriously. 247  
¶82 Change is also considered necessary in the very nature of human rights 
advocacy itself. First, there is a need to highlight the fact that in addition to the 
explicit undertaking by States Parties to the two Covenants, customary international 
law (as evidenced by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development) imposes the 
primary responsibility for the realization of human rights on governments. Thus, the 
traditional exclusive focus on exogenous factors in an attempt to explain Africa’s 
problems is no longer tenable. Secondly, as with civil and political rights, where the 
violation of economic rights undermines the dignity of the victims on a scale already 
described, the possible criminalization of those concerned should be a foremost 
consideration in human rights advocacy. This, after all, would be one way of giving 
any real meaning to the rhetoric proclaiming the indivisibility and interdependence of 
human rights.  
¶83 To be sure, any permanent solution to Africa’s problems will have to come 
from Africa; this, if nothing else, is the very essence of the right to self-determination. 
However, given how disempowered many of its people have become, this cannot be a 
practical possibility in the short term. Neither can the world afford to wait for long-
term solutions to emerge, given the urgency of the situation. The international 
community cannot therefore afford to abandon millions of helpless people to the 
whims of rulers who have proved themselves so instinctively contemptuous of their 
basic needs, and totally insensitive to their suffering.  
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